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BEING ALL IT CAN BE: A SOLUTION TO 
IMPROVE THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S 
OVERSEAS ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
MARGOT LAPORTE* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The environmental regulation of overseas military bases and 
operations should be an important component of the United States’ 
foreign and national security policies.  The Department of Defense 
(DoD) recognized over ten years ago that “America’s national 
interests are inextricably linked with the quality of the earth’s 
environment, and that threats to the environmental quality affect 
broad national economic and security interests . . . .”1  Environmental 
degradation, for instance, has been linked to destabilizing forces 
around the world, including “‘poverty, disease, and suffering.’”2  
Global environmental issues, including deforestation, oceanic 
degradation, biodiversity loss, and chemical pollutants threaten the 
health and security of U.S. citizens and interests abroad.3  
Implementing environmental regulations overseas would thus further 
national security and foreign policy interests by promoting stabilizing 
policies, international cooperation, and goodwill. 
 
 * Duke University School of Law, J.D. 2009; Dartmouth College, B.A. 2005.  The author 
would like to thank Professor Scott Silliman for his inspiration and advice.  She would also like 
to thank her family, whose encouragement, support, and suggestions were essential to the 
writing of this Note. 
 1. Memorandum of Understanding Among the Environmental Protection Agency, the 
Department of Energy, and the Department of Defense Concerning Cooperation in 
Environmental Security para. 2 (July 3, 1996), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/ 
envvest_mou.html.  
 2. Sherri Goodman, Deputy Under Sec’y of Def. for Envtl. Sec., Dep’t of Def., Address at 
the NATO/CCMS Environmental Security Conference (May 20, 1997) (quoting Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright), in PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE NATO/CCMS ENVIRONMENTAL 
SECURITY CONFERENCE, Sept. 1997, at 24.  
 3. Jonathan Margolis, Dep’t of State, Address at the NATO/CCMS Environmental 
Security Conference (May 20, 1997), in PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE NATO/CCMS 
ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY CONFERENCE, Sept. 1997, at 28.  
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These considerations have important practical consequences for 
the DoD’s development and implementation of overseas 
environmental policies.  First, environmental regulations at overseas 
military bases and during operations protect the national security 
interests of all U.S. citizens.  Of particular importance, regulations 
protect U.S. soldiers stationed overseas from environmental harms.  
Not only do these soldiers deserve the same level of environmental 
protection afforded soldiers on domestic bases, but those whose 
health is adversely affected by environmental conditions overseas 
may have diminished capacity to protect national security interests.  
Second, foreign nations, in response to U.S. policies that aim to 
respect and protect their natural resources, may provide the United 
States increased access to overseas bases.4  Finally, acting in an 
environmentally responsible manner may improve the United States’ 
image and facilitate relations with foreign nations.5 
The DoD’s current overseas environmental policies are 
inadequate to effectively regulate the environmental consequences of 
overseas military bases and operations.  The DoD, for instance, has 
implemented discrete policies concerning environmental assessment, 
compliance, pollution prevention, and remediation that fail to provide 
a coherent roadmap for environmental regulation overseas.  
Furthermore, the DoD affords commanders a tremendous amount of 
discretion in the implementation of these policies and provides for a 
number of exemptions through which commanders may avoid 
compliance. 
The DoD’s failure to implement a coherent and enforceable set 
of environmental policies has resulted in very real environmental 
harms overseas.  The United States maintained 823 sites in 39 
countries in FY 20076 and has been involved in a number of overseas 
operations, including those in Iraq and Afghanistan.  As a result of 
the DoD’s failure to implement environmental policies that 
adequately regulate overseas military bases, U.S. forces have 
damaged the environments of host nations to such an extent that the 
 
 4. James E. Landis, The Domestic Implications of Environmental Stewardship at Overseas 
Installations: A Look at Domestic Questions Raised by the United States’ Overseas 
Environmental Policies, 49 NAVAL L. REV. 99, 101 (2002). 
 5. Id. at 102. 
 6. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF., DEP’T OF DEF., BASE STRUCTURE 
REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2007 BASELINE 6 (Sept. 30, 2006). 
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costs for environmental cleanup and remediation of just one base 
“could approach Superfund proportions.”7 
Furthermore, the lack of environmental regulations during 
overseas operations has permitted open burn pits at bases in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, which spew smoke containing known carcinogens.8  For 
instance, at Balad Air Force Base in Iraq, commanders utilized jet 
fuel in a burn pit—the sole means of trash disposal for four years—to 
burn 500,000 pounds of trash per day, including plastics, food, and 
medical wastes.9  In a still-classified study, the Chief of Aeromedical 
Services stated that “the known carcinogens and respiratory 
sensitizers released into the atmosphere by the burn pit present both 
an acute and chronic health hazard to our troops and the local 
populations.”10  In fact, many soldiers who have been exposed to the 
burn pit have reported chronic cough and shortness of breath.11 
It is, therefore, clear that the DoD must improve its overseas 
environmental regulations.  Rather than a complete overhaul of the 
DoD’s environmental regime, change should be effected through the 
factors which influence current DoD policy: international 
agreements, federal environmental statutes with extraterritorial 
effect, and executive orders.  Of these, the DoD is most likely to 
improve its overseas environmental policies in response to an 
executive order.  International agreements have historically failed to 
establish mandatory protections for the environments of foreign 
countries.  The requirements of the most applicable environmental 
statutes, the National Environmental Policy Act and the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act, may not be applied extraterritorially to overseas 
military bases.   
The applicable executive orders currently in force, however, fail 
to compel the DoD to implement adequate overseas environmental 
regulations.  I, therefore, propose an Executive Order that would 
mandate environmental standards equivalent to those required 
domestically, while allowing base commanders flexibility and 
 
 7. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MILITARY BASE CLOSURES: U.S. FINANCIAL 
OBLIGATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES 27 (1992) (discussing the costs of cleanup and remediation 
for U.S. bases in the Philippines) [hereinafter GAO BASE CLOSURES REPORT].  
 8. Adam Levine, Effects of Toxic Smoke Worry Troops Returning from Iraq, CNN.COM, 
Dec. 15, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/12/15/burn.pits/index.html. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.  Soldiers have named the resulting cough “Iraqi crud.”  Id. 
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respecting the sovereignty of foreign nations.  This Executive Order 
would provide the DoD the standards necessary to implement an 
overseas environmental policy that is truly protective of U.S. national 
security and foreign policy interests. 
II. CURRENT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OVERSEAS 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
In response to executive orders, the highlighting of deficiencies 
in the DoD’s overseas environmental management by the U.S. 
General Accounting Office (GAO),12 and changing norms in 
international environmental law,13 the DoD has implemented policies 
regarding environmental assessment, compliance standards, pollution 
prevention, and remediation at overseas bases and during military 
operations.  Although these policies reflect progress in the DoD’s 
commitment to preventing and remedying environmental damage, 
they are inadequate to compel commanders to enforce sufficient 
environmental regulations.  First, the DoD did not draft its policies as 
a coherent environmental regime, but rather drafted its standards as 
separate, yet parallel, to one another.14  This lack of coherence is 
likely to engender confusion among commanders, thus decreasing the 
standards’ effectiveness.  Second, the policies prescribe the minimum 
environmental standards to be implemented by commanders, but 
provide no incentives for commanders to implement more rigid 
standards.15 
Third, the DoD does not conduct sufficient oversight to ensure 
that overseas bases and operations comply with its environmental 
policies.16  In 1980, the Secretary of Defense assigned the primary 
responsibility for ensuring that overseas military bases comply with 
environmental laws and policies to base commanders, who may then 
delegate this responsibility to another person or office.17  As a result, 
according to the GAO, “there is no assurance that the bases are 
 
 12. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE: MANAGEMENT 
PROBLEMS CONTINUE AT OVERSEAS MILITARY BASES (1991) [hereinafter GAO HAZARDOUS 
WASTE REPORT]. 
 13. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 14. See discussion infra Part II.A–D. 
 15. See Richard A. Phelps, Environmental Law for Overseas Installations, 40 A.F. L. REV. 
49, 67 (1996). 
 16. GAO HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORT, supra note 12, at 8. 
 17. Id. 
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properly [implementing environmental policies].”18  In its audit of the 
management of overseas military bases’ environmental policy, for 
example, the GAO reported that oversight by outside organizations 
such as Inspector General offices, commands, and audit agencies was 
limited.19  Furthermore, oversight on bases was “inadequate” due to 
the poorly staffed and low-priority base operations charged with 
overseeing environmental management.20 
Fourth, DoD environmental policies do not contain specific 
sanctions for failure to comply with their requirements.21  Fifth, DoD 
policies provide a number of loopholes through which commanders 
may avoid environmental requirements, including broad exceptions 
and ambiguous key terms and procedures for implementation.22 
Finally, neither Congress nor the DoD has sufficient oversight of 
the funds devoted by military bases to environmental cleanup.  
Rather than allocating funds to a separate account for the 
implementation of environmental policies overseas, Congress has 
appropriated overseas environmental funds as part of military bases’ 
account for operations and maintenance.23  Environmental protection 
and remediation funds are pulled from the same account as funds 
used, for example, to maintain aircraft, ships, tanks, and buildings.24  
As a result, neither Congress nor the DoD is able to determine 
whether funds are being properly utilized for the implementation of 
environmental policies or whether the current funding is sufficient.25 
As a result of these failures, the DoD’s current overseas 
environmental policies concerning assessment, compliance, pollution 
prevention, and remediation are inadequate to protect the 
environments of foreign nations. 
 
 18. Id. at 12. 
 19. Id. at 16.  
 20. See id. 
 21. Phelps, supra note 15, at 74. 
 22. See discussion infra Part II.A–D. 
 23. Mark Hamilton, Assistant to the Assistant Deputy Sec’y of Def. for Overseas 
Installations, Status of the U.S. Overseas Bases Program: Governmental Perspective (Oct. 25, 
1999), in INST. OF POLICY STUDIES, THE INT’L GRASSROOTS SUMMIT ON MILITARY BASE 
CLEANUP 3 (2000).  
 24. Id. 
 25. See id. 
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A.  Environmental Assessment 
1.  Executive Order 12114 
On January 4, 1979, President Carter issued Executive Order 
12114—Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions 
(E.O. 12114), requiring federal agencies, including the DoD, to 
consider the environmental effects of their actions abroad.26  The 
objective of the Order was to “provide information for use by 
decisionmakers, to heighten awareness of and interest in 
environmental concerns and, as appropriate, to facilitate 
environmental cooperation with foreign nations.”27  E.O. 12114 
mandated a process that federal agencies must follow before taking 
actions abroad but did not specify any substantive requirements.  As 
such, E.O. 12114 required that, when authorizing or approving 
“major federal actions” that will significantly affect overseas 
environments,28 agency decision makers must research, produce, and 
take into consideration specified documents assessing the 
environmental impact of their actions on the foreign nation.29 
Although E.O. 12114 furthered the goal of limiting 
environmental harm caused by federal agencies abroad, the Order 
included a number of exemptions which have been broadly 
interpreted by federal agencies to limit their obligation to comply 
with its requirements.  For instance, in order for a foreign nation to 
receive the benefits of the Order, it cannot have participated with the 
United States or have been involved in the federal action significantly 
affecting the environment.30  The Order also allowed agencies to 
modify the contents, timing, and availability of environmental 
documents in a number of broadly defined circumstances.31 
2.  Department of Defense Directive 6050.7 
The DoD issued Directive 6050.7—Environmental Effects 
Abroad of Major Department of Defense Actions to establish internal 
procedures for the implementation of E.O. 12114 both at military 
 
 26. Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1979), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.S. § 4321 (2000) 
[hereinafter E.O. 12114].  E.O. 12114 was still in force as of October 15, 2008.  See 43 C.F.R. § 
46.170 (2008). 
 27. Id. § 2-2. 
 28. Id. § 2-1. 
 29. See id. § 2-4(a).  
 30. Id. § 2-3(b). 
 31. Id. § 2-5(b). 
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bases and during operations.32  The Directive defines key terms left 
undefined by E.O. 12114 and details the documents that must be 
produced and considered by DoD officials when authorizing or 
approving “major federal actions that do significant harm to the 
environment of places outside the United States.”33  Because E.O. 
12114 failed to define the term “major action,” the DoD interpreted it 
to mean that environmental assessments are only required for actions 
“of considerable importance involving substantial expenditures of 
time, money, and resources, that affect[] the environment on a large 
geographic scale or ha[ve] substantial environmental effects on a 
more limited geographical area . . . .”34 
Although the Directive purports to provide guidance on the 
implementation of E.O. 12114, it leaves a tremendous amount of 
discretion to base commanders to decide whether an environmental 
assessment should be prepared35 and which of two specified forms it 
should take.36  The Directive does not provide any instruction 
regarding which factors to consider when determining whether 
environmental harm will be sufficiently “significant” for an 
environmental assessment to be prepared.  If the commander decides 
that the harm will not be significant, the decision will be simply 
recorded in a file.37  If the commander decides that harm will be 
significant, no further action may be taken that would do “significant 
harm to the environment” until an environmental assessment has 
been completed and the results considered.38  Once these procedural 
requirements have been satisfied, the Directive does not require that 
the results of environmental assessments affect any substantive 
aspects of military activities. 
The DoD also took full advantage of the discretion granted by 
E.O. 12114 to implement a number of exceptions which may be 
utilized to justify failure to conduct an environmental assessment.  
These exemptions are so broad that they “would likely provide 
exempted status to most foreseeable overseas military operations.”39  
 
 32. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NUMBER 6050.7: ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ABROAD OF 
MAJOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIONS § 1 (1979) [hereinafter DIRECTIVE 6050.7].  
 33. Id. §§ 1, 3, E2.3–.4. 
 34. Id. § 3.5. 
 35. See id. §§ 5.4.1, E2.4.3, E2.5.3. 
 36. See id. § E2.3.1.1.  
 37. Id. § E2.4.3, .5.3.  
 38. DIRECTIVE 6050.7, supra note 32, § E2.4.3, .5.3.  
 39. Richard M. Whitaker, Environmental Aspects of Overseas Operations: An Update, 1997 
ARMY LAW. 17, 23 (1997). 
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The Directive also incorporates E.O. 12114’s allowance for flexibility 
in the preparation, content, and distribution of environmental 
assessment documents.40  For example, the DoD reserves the right to 
modify the documents’ requirements when necessary to avoid 
infringement, or even the appearance of infringement, on the internal 
affairs and sovereignty of another government.41 
Furthermore, consistent with E.O. 12114,42 environmental 
assessments must only be conducted for “[m]ajor federal actions that 
significantly harm the environment of a foreign nation that is not 
involved in the action.”43  The Directive states that a foreign nation 
may be involved through direct participation with the United States 
in the environmentally harmful action, or through cooperation with 
another nation participating in the harmful action.44  However, since 
the Directive does not specify the level of participation necessary to 
disqualify a foreign nation from receiving the benefits of an 
environmental assessment, this provision has been broadly 
interpreted to exclude any number of foreign nations where U.S. 
armed forces were present.45 
The United States, for instance, utilized the broad “participating 
nation exception” to avoid the requirement of conducting 
environmental assessments during Operation Uphold Democracy in 
Haiti in 1994.46  The United States, under the authority of U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 940,47 sent paratroopers to Haiti to oust 
the illegitimate Cedras regime from power just as the regime agreed 
 
 40. See E.O. 12114, supra note 26, § 2-5(b). 
 41. DIRECTIVE 6050.7, supra note 32, § E2.4.6.3.  The DoD appears to have had serious 
concerns regarding infringement on the sovereignty of host countries under E.O. 12114.  In 
addition to this exemption, the Directive states that the DoD’s policy is to “act[] with care 
within the jurisdiction of a foreign nation.  Treaty obligations and the sovereignty of other 
nations must be respected, and restraint must be exercised in applying United States laws within 
foreign nations unless the Congress has expressly provided otherwise.”  Id. § 4.3.  The DoD thus 
may have been concerned that the Order, issued by the President rather than by Congress, 
applied U.S. environmental standards to foreign countries, and required invasive environmental 
assessment procedures that may interfere with the sovereignty of host nations.  See id. § 4. 
 42. See E.O. 12114, supra note 26, § 2-3(b). 
 43. DIRECTIVE 6050.7, supra note 32, § E2.2.1.1. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See, e.g., Karen V. Fair, Environmental Compliance in Contingency Operations: In 
Search of a Standard?, 157 MIL. L. REV. 112, 131–34 (1998). 
 46. See id. at 133. 
 47. U.N. Security Council Resolution 940 authorized the creation of a multilateral force to 
restore the legitimately elected President in Haiti.  S.C. Res. 940, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 
(July 31, 1994). 
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to relinquish control.48  The United States considered the new 
government of Haiti to be a “participating nation” and exempted it 
from receiving environmental assessments.49 
Operation Uphold Democracy exemplifies how E.O. 12114 and 
Directive 6050.7 may be interpreted broadly under circumstances in 
which a country did not clearly participate in the action.  Although 
the new government of Haiti consented to the entry of U.S. forces 
under a legitimate international agreement, it may not have 
voluntarily agreed to host U.S. forces, but rather may have 
capitulated to the coercion of a superpower and the United Nations.50  
Thus, under this exception, weaker countries may be legally coerced 
into giving up their right to environmental assessments. 
As a result of the discretion left to commanders and numerous 
broad exemptions, for which E.O. 12114 clearly provided, complete 
and fair implementation of E.O. 12114 at overseas military bases and 
during operations cannot be guaranteed. 
B.  Environmental Compliance Standards 
The DoD defined its substantive standards for environmental 
compliance at overseas military bases through Instruction 4715.5—
Management of Environmental Compliance at Overseas Installations 
(1996)51 and the Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance 
Document (OEBGD) (2007).52  Instruction 4715.5 and the OEBGD 
do not apply to overseas military operations.53  The DoD also 
explicitly stated that Instruction 4715.5 “does not apply to 
 
 48. Fair, supra note 45, at 131–32. 
 49. Id. at 131–33. 
 50. Whitaker, supra note 39, at 22. 
 51. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NUMBER 4715.5: MANAGEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
COMPLIANCE AT OVERSEAS INSTALLATIONS (1996) [hereinafter INSTRUCTION 4715.5].  
Instruction 4715.5 was implemented in response to the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1991, id. § 1.2, which directed the Secretary of Defense to “develop a policy for 
determining the responsibilities of the Department of Defense with respect to cleaning up 
environmental contamination that may be present at military installations located outside the 
United States.  In developing the policy, the Secretary shall take into account applicable 
international agreements (such as Status of Forces agreements), multinational or joint use and 
operation of such installations, relative share of the collective defense burden, and negotiated 
accommodations.”  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-
510, § 342(b), 104 Stat. 1485, 1537–38 (1990).  
 52. OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF. FOR ACQUISITION, TECH., AND LOGISTICS, 
DEP’T OF DEF., OVERSEAS ENVIRONMENTAL BASELINE GUIDANCE DOCUMENT (2007) 
[hereinafter OEBGD].  
 53. Id. § C1.3.3; INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51, § 2.1.4.  
Laporte_Fmt5 .doc 2/12/2010  9:57:52 AM 
212 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM Vol. 20:203 
environmental analyses conducted under E.O. 12114.”54  In doing so, 
the DoD created a substantive compliance regime wholly separate 
from the procedural requirements established in E.O. 12114 and 
Directive 6050.7.  In fulfilling Instruction 4715.5’s substantive 
compliance standards, commanders are therefore not required to 
base their conduct on assessments under E.O. 12114. 
Instruction 4715.5 mandated the creation of the OEBGD, a 
document that specified the minimum substantive standards that 
commanders must observe in developing environmental compliance 
standards at overseas military bases.55  In mandating such standards, 
the OEBGD took into consideration “generally accepted 
environmental standards” applicable to military bases in the United 
States and incorporated U.S. laws that may be applied 
extraterritorially.56 
Instruction 4715.5 also provided for the development of Final 
Governing Standards (FGS), which dictate country-specific 
substantive environmental compliance standards for overseas military 
bases.57  The FGS for each host nation are determined by 
Environmental Executive Agents (EEAs), who are appointed by the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security 
(DUSD(ES)).58  EEAs are only appointed, and FGS only 
promulgated, “in foreign countries where DoD installations are 
located and where the DUSD(ES) determines that the level of DoD 
presence justifies the establishment of FGS.”59 
Once appointed, the EEA must then determine country-specific 
FGS based on the criteria and management practices mandated in the 
OEBGD.60  Instruction 4715.5 specifies that if host nation 
environmental standards or international agreements provide more 
protection “to human health and the environment” than the 
OEBGD, the EEA should generally use the more protective 
standards when developing the FGS.61  The EEA should, in all cases, 
 
 54. INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51, § 2.1.7. 
 55. Phelps, supra note 15, at 54–55; see also Hamilton, supra note 23, at 2 (noting that the 
OEBGD provides commanders at overseas military bases a “major measuring stick to use to 
begin to develop environmental programs”). 
 56. INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51, § 6.2.1. 
 57. Id. § 4.1. 
 58. Id. § 6.1.1. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. § 6.3.3.1; OEBGD, supra note 52, § C1.1. 
 61. INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51, § 6.3.3.1. 
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comply with any international agreement with a host nation that 
establishes a different standard.62  Once FGS are established in a host 
nation, military base commanders in that nation are charged with 
implementing policies to ensure compliance with the FGS’ 
substantive standards.63 
In host countries that the DUSD(ES) has determined do not 
warrant FGS,64 commanders must comply with applicable 
international agreements, host nation environmental standards,65 and 
the OEBGD.66  In cases of conflicting requirements, military bases 
must comply with the requirement that is “more protective of human 
health and the environment.”67 
Although Instruction 4715.5 and the OEBGD set essential 
environmental compliance standards for U.S. bases in host nations, a 
number of exceptions and funding requirements decrease their 
effectiveness.  First, the Instruction and the OEBGD do not apply to 
the determination or remediation of environmental harm caused by 
the DoD’s past activities.68 
Second, the OEBGD sets the minimum, not the ideal, standard 
for environmental compliance.69  Although Instruction 4715.5 
provides for higher compliance standards if host nation 
environmental laws or international agreements are more protective, 
these circumstances are unlikely to occur in many host nations.  Many 
host nations do not have, or do not enforce, stringent environmental 
regulations.70  As the requirement to comply with host nation 
standards has generally been interpreted, military bases must only 
comply with standards to the extent that they are enforced by the host 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. § 6.3.5 (“The DoD Components in a foreign nation for which FGS have been 
established shall comply with the FGS established for that country.”). 
 64. See id. § 6.1.1. 
 65. Id. § 6.3.8.  This requirement was implemented in response to President Carter’s 1978 
Executive Order 12088—Federal Compliance with Pollution Control Standards, requiring that 
“[t]he head of each Executive agency that is responsible for the construction or operation of 
Federal facilities outside the United States shall ensure that such construction or operation 
complies with the environmental pollution control standards of general applicability in the host 
country or jurisdiction.”  Exec. Order No. 12,088, 3 C.F.R. 243 § 1-801 (1979), reprinted in 42 
U.S.C. § 4321 (2000). 
 66. INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51, § 6.3.8. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. § 2.1.6; OEBGD, supra note 52, § C1.3.5. 
 69. See Phelps, supra note 15, at 55. 
 70. GAO HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORT, supra note 12, at 12. 
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country.71  For example, although water and air quality standards in 
the Philippines are generally equivalent to U.S. standards, the 
Philippine government does not enforce these laws against its citizens 
or military bases.  As a result, the United States does not recognize 
the higher standards as binding.72 
Furthermore, unless specified in an agreement, the United States 
has no legal obligation to comply with the host nations’ 
environmental laws.73  Most agreements between the United States 
and host nations do not include specific provisions regarding 
environmental protection or remediation.74  As a result, the 
OEBGD’s minimum standards govern the protection of most host 
countries’ environments.  Additionally, many international 
agreements between the United States and host nations release the 
United States from any obligation to remediate or compensate 
environmental damage.75  Thus, even if a host nation’s laws are 
protective of the environment, the EEA will base the nation’s FGS on 
any agreements disclaiming U.S. liability for environmental harm 
caused by its overseas military bases.76 
Third, both Instruction 4715.5 and the OEBGD contain a 
number of exemptions.  Specifically, neither document’s provisions 
apply to core daily military operations,77 including off-base 
operational and training deployments.78  The Instruction and the 
OEBGD state that such operations and deployments should be 
conducted “in accordance with applicable international agreements, 
other DoD Directives and Instructions and environmental annexes 
incorporated into operation plans or operation orders.”79 
However, as exemplified in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia 
in 1992, such guidance is inadequate during operational and training 
 
 71. GAO BASE CLOSURES REPORT, supra note 7, at 29. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 256 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 74. Phelps, supra note 15, at 57. 
 75. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.  These agreements are, at times, negotiated under a 
power imbalance, in which host nations that are reliant upon the economic stimulus provided by 
U.S. military bases feel pressured to make environmental concessions.  Id. 
 76. See Hamilton, supra note 23, at 13 (“In terms of being required to follow host country 
laws, I have to go back to the basic rules of the game for us, which is the SOFA.  If the SOFA 
says to [follow the host nation’s laws] and we agree to that, then we’ll do it.  If the SOFA is 
silent or addresses it in a different way, we don’t do it.  We don’t have a legal requirement to do 
it.”). 
 77. Landis, supra note 4, at 119.  
 78. INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51, § 2.1.4; OEBGD, supra note 52, § C1.3.3. 
 79. INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51, § 2.1.4; OEBGD, supra note 52, § C1.3.3. 
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deployments.  The DoD considered Operation Restore Hope to be 
exempt from its environmental compliance policies, and, given the 
“nature of the operation and the existing level of destruction in 
[Somalia], environmental considerations were admittedly a ‘low 
priority.’”80  In addition, Somalia lacked any form of local government 
or regulatory system, leading to an absence of any environmental 
controls.  Although U.S. forces prepared an environmental annex, it 
was largely neglected.81  Operation Restore Hope, therefore, 
demonstrates how the DoD’s environmental compliance policy 
containing broad discretion and exemptions is grossly inadequate to 
provide environmental protection to both the foreign country and 
U.S. troops during operations.82 
Finally, the DoD does not specify requirements for prioritizing 
the funding of environmental compliance standards in the FGS or 
OEBGD under any but the most dire circumstances.83  Instruction 
4715.5 states only that funding for environmental compliance 
requirements should be determined according to “risk-based 
prioritization, based on local circumstances and long-term 
objectives.”84  Furthermore, when a host nation agrees to release the 
United States from liability for environmental damage in an 
international agreement, military bases are not authorized to expend 
funds or other resources to address environmental harms.85  
Commanders can thus easily justify not allocating sufficient, or any, 
funds to environmental compliance. 
C.  Pollution Prevention 
Unlike the DoD’s regimes concerning environmental assessment 
and compliance, the DoD’s compliance and pollution prevention 
regimes are related.  Instruction 4715.5 and the OEBGD specify that 
compliance standards should be attained primarily through pollution 
prevention, so long as prevention is “economically advantageous and 
consistent with mission requirements.”86  The DoD created its 
pollution prevention regime through Instruction 4715.4—Pollution 
 
 80. Fair, supra note 45, at 129 (citation omitted). 
 81. Id. at 130. 
 82. See id. at 130–31. 
 83. See INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51, § 6.5.2. 
 84. Id. § 6.5.2.4. 
 85. Id. § 6.5.3. 
 86. INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51, § 4.3. 
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Prevention (1996) and the OEBGD (2007).87  Instruction 4715.4 
provides “additional pollution prevention guidance”88 through 
procedural requirements89 that are to be applied in a manner 
consistent with Instruction 4715.5’s substantive requirements,90 while 
the OEBGD establishes substantive pollution standards for overseas 
military bases.91 
Although Instruction 4715.4 does not include the same number 
of broad exemptions as the DoD’s environmental assessment and 
compliance policies, its initiatives are tempered by the constant 
reminder that they are to be implemented “in the most economical 
manner,”92 or only “where cost effective.”93  Given that commanders 
have the discretion to determine whether pollution prevention 
measures are economically feasible, such provisions provide an easy 
means of avoiding the implementation of pollution prevention 
programs. 
D.  Environmental Remediation 
1.  Department of Defense Instruction 4715.8 
Instruction 4715.8—Environmental Remediation for DoD 
Activities Overseas (1998) sets forth the DoD’s policies regarding 
remediation of environmental contamination caused by the DoD 
both on and off overseas military bases.94  The Instruction explicitly 
states that these policies do not apply to the substantive 
environmental requirements issued under Instruction 4715.5 and the 
OEBGD.95  The Instruction, therefore, creates a remediation regime 
separate from compliance standards. 
The Instruction requires that EEAs, as designated in Instruction 
4715.5 on compliance standards, establish country-specific 
remediation policies, which should, among other requirements: (1) 
 
 87. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NUMBER 4715.4: POLLUTION PREVENTION (1996) 
[hereinafter INSTRUCTION 4715.4].  
 88. INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51, § 6.7. 
 89. See generally INSTRUCTION 4715.4, supra note 87. 
 90. Id. § 2.2. 
 91. See Phelps, supra note 15.  See generally INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51; OEBGD, 
supra note 52. 
 92. INSTRUCTION 4715.4, supra note 87, § 6.2.3.1. 
 93. Id. § 6.2.3.3.1,.2.  
 94. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NUMBER 4715.8: ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION FOR 
DOD ACTIVITIES OVERSEAS § 2.1.2, .3 (1998) [hereinafter INSTRUCTION 4715.8]. 
 95. Id. § 2.2.1. 
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define the appropriate level of remediation at contaminated sites, and 
(2) establish procedures for negotiating remedial measures with the 
host nation.96  Base commanders must then remedy environmental 
contamination to the extent required under Instruction 4715.8 and the 
country-specific standards established by the EEAs.97 
Instruction 4715.8 specifies procedures that must be followed to 
effect remediation.  Such procedures depend on whether the 
contamination occurred at overseas military bases that are “open and 
have not been designated for return” to the host country,98 at bases 
that “have been designated for return or that are already returned,”99 
or outside of overseas military bases.100  Under all circumstances, 
however, overseas base commanders are required to take “prompt 
action” only when remedying “known imminent and substantial 
endangerments to human health and safety that are due to 
environmental contamination that was caused by DoD operations.”101 
Remediation under Instruction 4715.8 is inherently limited by its 
terms.  First, in order to warrant any remediation at all, 
environmental contamination must be “known.”102  Commanders are 
thus under no obligation to foresee dangers, and, in fact, have an 
incentive not to conduct studies to determine the future 
environmental impacts of their activities. 
Second, Instruction 4715.8 severely limits the circumstances 
under which it will apply.  For instance, although the Instruction 
applies to current DoD operations, it does not apply to operations 
“connected with actual or threatened hostilities, security assistance 
programs, peacekeeping missions, or relief operations.”103  The 
Instruction also does not apply to “[a]ctions to remedy environmental 
contamination that are covered by requirements in environmental 
annexes to operation orders . . . .”104 
Third, the DoD failed to set adequate assessment criteria and 
remediation standards.  Instruction 4715.8 does not provide any 
criteria for commanders to assess whether environmental 
 
 96. Id. § 4.2.3.1. 
 97. Id. § 4.2.1. 
 98. Id. § 5.1. 
 99. Id. § 5.2. 
 100. INSTRUCTION 4715.8, supra note 94, § 5.3.1. 
 101. Id. § 5.1.1, .2.1, .3.1. 
 102. Id. § 5.1.1. 
 103. Id. § 2.1.3. 
 104. Id. § 2.2.1. 
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contamination presents “imminent and substantial endangerment.”105  
Given the restrictive nature of the phrase, commanders can likely 
exclude the vast majority of environmental issues.  Furthermore, the 
Instruction failed to define adequate remediation standards.  
Environmental contamination need only be remedied to the point 
that it does not pose “imminent and substantial endangerment to 
human health, environment, and safety.”106  Given the immediacy and 
urgency implicit in this phrase, commanders are not obligated to 
implement high levels of remediation.  Commanders, in fact, are 
given the flexibility to order such little remedial action as restricting 
access to contaminated areas.107  While protecting human health and 
safety in the short term (as implied by the term “imminent”), such 
action would hardly safeguard the host nation’s environment and 
people from the ill-effects of such contamination in the future.108 
Fourth, it may be difficult to determine when the DoD “caused” 
environmental contamination in host nations.  As with the 
“participating nation exception” to E.O. 12114 and Directive 6050.7, 
the line between action that was clearly taken by the DoD and action 
that was taken with the consent, or participation, of the host nation 
may not be clear.109  If the host nation approved of, or in any way 
participated in, the action causing environmental contamination, the 
DoD can claim that it did not “cause” the contamination and avoid 
the obligation to remediate it. 
Finally, neither Congress nor the DoD has allocated additional 
funds for remediation.  The Instruction provides that the remediation 
requirements are to apply, “subject to the availability of funds.”110  
Since the funds that Congress allocates for the DoD’s environmental 
overseas policies are pulled from the same account as the funds for 
operations and maintenance of overseas military bases,111 remediation 
projects must compete with operations and maintenance projects for 
financing.112  Given the broad discretion Instruction 4715.8 affords 
base commanders in approving remediation programs,113 and given 
 
 105. See id. § 5.1.1, .2.1, .3.1. 
 106. INSTRUCTION 4715.8, supra note 94, § 5.4.3. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 110. Id. § 5. 
 111. Hamilton, supra note 23, at 3. 
 112. Phelps, supra note 15, at 81. 
 113. See supra notes 105–108 and accompanying text. 
Laporte_Fmt5 .doc 2/12/2010  9:57:52 AM 
Winter 2010 BEING ALL IT CAN BE 219 
the lack of transparency and oversight inherent in the combined 
environmental programs, operations and maintenance projects 
account,114 it is unlikely that commanders would pull funds from other 
operations and maintenance programs in order to fund any but the 
most urgent environmental remediation projects. 
Although remediation at bases that are open and not scheduled 
for return to host countries, and at areas outside of bases, is limited 
only by the general requirements above,115 remediation at bases that 
have been designated for return or that are already returned is 
minimized by additional limitations.  First, remediation may be 
completed after the return of a base to the host nation; however, it 
must be limited to specifications detailed in a remediation plan 
approved by the commander before the base’s return.116  The 
Instruction does not provide any standards which commanders must 
follow in approving or denying the remediation plan.117  Remediation, 
therefore, is limited by the need to prepare a plan and obtain the base 
commander’s approval in advance. 
Second, after the military base is returned to the host nation, the 
DoD may not fund any remediation beyond that required by a 
binding international agreement or under an approved remediation 
plan, as described above.118  Because most international agreements 
do not include specific provisions regarding environmental 
remediation,119 the United States is generally under no obligation to 
comply if the host nation requests remediation.120  Host nations are 
thus compelled to perform additional remediation,121 identify the 
contamination “as an offset against the residual value of DoD capital 
improvements,”122 or make claims under relevant provisions, if any, of 
the applicable international agreement to regain remediation costs.123 
 
 114. See Hamilton, supra note 23, at 3. 
 115. See INSTRUCTION 4715.8, supra note 94, § 5.1, .3. 
 116. Id. § 5.2.1. 
 117. See id. 
 118. Id. § 5.2.3.3. 
 119. Phelps, supra note 15, at 57. 
 120. See id. at 80; Hamilton, supra note 23, at 8 (“In the way the thing is working, when we 
leave the facility, in the absence of some agreement which specifically says we have activities to 
take, it’s over. . . . In the Philippines . . . the United States closed their facilities, left their 
facilities, the host country took those facilities and that was the end of it.”). 
 121. See, e.g., INSTRUCTION 4715.8, supra note 94, § 5.1.4. 
 122. Id. § 5.5. 
 123. Phelps, supra note 15, at 80. 
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2.  Final Governing Standards 
Although FGS, as determined by the OEBGD, do not generally 
apply to remediation of environmental problems caused by the 
DoD’s “past activities,”124 the OEBGD provides for remediation in 
response to spills and leaks from underground storage tanks.125  The 
OEBGD, for instance, instructs overseas military bases to create a 
Spill Prevention and Response Plan, including measures to prevent, 
and, “to the maximum extent practicable,” to remove, a “worst case 
discharge” of hazardous substances and refined petroleum, oil, and 
lubricant (POL) spills.126  If hazardous wastes leak or spill in any way, 
the base must contain “visible releases to the environment.”127 
The OEBGD fails, however, to provide substantive standards for 
remediation.  For cleanup of hazardous substances and POL spills 
from underground storage tanks,128 the OEBGD focuses on an 
ambiguous notion of containment, rather than on substantive 
remediation standards.129  After an undefined initial response has 
been completed, for instance, any remaining pollutants and 
“obviously contaminated soil” must be “appropriately removed and 
managed” according to Instruction 4715.8.130  Although the OEBGD 
provides the most specific remediation standards for leaks or spills of 
hazardous wastes, it again fails to provide any substantive standards 
for remediation. 
The limitations of Instruction 4715.8 and the OEBGD thus have 
a detrimental effect on a host nation’s ability to obtain remediation 
for environmental contamination caused by the DoD. 
III. FACTORS INFLUENCING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
Given that current DoD policy is inadequate to fully address 
environmental concerns at overseas military bases and during 
operations, change must be effected through factors that influence 
DoD policy.  In formulating its policies, the DoD considers: (1) 
 
 124. OEBGD, supra note 52, § C1.3.5. 
 125. Phelps, supra note 15, at 77–78. 
 126. OEBGD, supra note 52, § C18.3.1.  A “worst case discharge” is “[t]he largest 
foreseeable discharge from the facility.”  Id. § C18.2.9. 
 127. Id. § C6.3.7.6.2. 
 128. See id. § C18.3.3. 
 129. See id. § C18.1. 
 130. Id. § C18.3.6. 
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international agreements;131 (2) federal environmental statutes with 
extraterritorial effect;132 and (3) executive orders.133 
The DoD, however, is most likely to significantly improve its 
overseas environmental policy in response to executive orders.  
Historically, international agreements have failed to provide 
protection for the environment of host nations, at times even 
including provisions disclaiming U.S. liability for the environmental 
harms it causes.  Additionally, the requirements of the most 
applicable federal statutes, the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA)134 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),135 cannot be applied 
extraterritorially to regulate environmental harm overseas, as neither 
statute overcomes the presumption against extraterritoriality.136  
Executive orders, on the other hand, have been shown to effect 
changes in DoD overseas environmental policy.137  Furthermore, the 
President has unquestionable constitutional authority to issue 
executive orders concerning the DoD.138  Thus, an executive order 
must be utilized in order to effect improvements in the DoD’s 
overseas environmental policy. 
A.  International Agreements 
1.  Status of Forces Agreements and Basing Agreements 
DoD policy regarding the determination of FGS, pollution 
prevention, and remediation is dictated, in part, by applicable 
 
 131. See, e.g., INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51, § 4.1 (considering international 
agreements in creating FGS); INSTRUCTION 4715.4, supra note 87, § 4.1.1 (“It is DoD policy to: 
Ensure . . . installations located outside the United States [comply] with applicable . . . 
international agreements . . . .”); INSTRUCTION 4715.8, supra note 94, § 5.1.3 (“International 
agreements may also require the United States to fund environmental remediation.”). 
 132. See, e.g., OEBGD, supra note 52, § C1.4.5.1 (incorporating federal environmental 
statutes with extraterritorial effect); INSTRUCTION 4715.4, supra note 87, § 4.1.1 (“It is DoD 
policy to: Ensure . . . installations located outside the United States [comply] with applicable . . . 
Federal statutes with extraterritorial effect . . . .”). 
 133. See, e.g., DIRECTIVE 6050.7, supra note 32, § 1 (implementing E.O. 12114); 
INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51, § 4.1 (implementing Executive Order 12088); INSTRUCTION 
4715.4, supra note 87, § 4.1.1 (“It is DoD policy to: Ensure . . . installations located outside the 
United States [comply] with applicable Executive Orders . . . .”). 
 134. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321–4370 (2006). 
 135. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9601–9675 (2006). 
 136. See infra Part III.B. 
 137. See infra Part III.C. 
 138. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
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international agreements.139  These agreements impose legal 
obligations, similar to contractual obligations, on the United States 
and other parties to the agreements.140  Generally, such agreements 
are in the form of Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), which 
define the legal status of U.S. military personnel and property in host 
nations;141 or basing agreements, which define rights and obligations 
arising from the use of military bases in a host country.142 
Although some of the more developed host countries are 
beginning to propose terms that would provide guidelines for 
environmental protection or remediation, the vast majority of 
international agreements signed by the United States do not define 
environmental compliance standards.143  Some agreements contain 
claims that are sufficiently broad to cover injuries to people or 
property due to environmental contamination caused by U.S. 
forces;144 however, the agreements do not provide for environmental 
protection or remediation and generally include provisions which 
limit the ability of host nation claimants to recover for environmental 
damage.145 
The 1947 basing agreement between the United States and the 
Philippines, for instance, stated that the United States would provide 
“reasonable compensation” for claims arising from harm to property 
or people caused by U.S. armed forces.146  Although this provision was 
likely broad enough to encompass environmental damage, the ability 
of Philippine claimants to receive compensation was limited in several 
important ways, including that claims must have been presented 
within one year after the occurrence of the incident leading to the 
claim.147  Claimants were thus foreclosed from recovering for injuries 
 
 139. See supra note 131. 
 140. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 256 (2d Cir. 2003).  
 141. GlobalSecurity.org, Status-of-Forces Agreement [SOFA],  
http://www. globalsecurity.org/military/ facility/sofa.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2008). 
 142. See, e.g., Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of the 
Philippines Concerning Military Bases, U.S.-Phil., Mar. 14, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1,775 [hereinafter 
Philippines Basing Agreement]. 
 143. See Phelps, supra note 15, at 57–58. 
 144. Id. at 57. 
 145. See id. at 57–58. 
 146. Philippines Basing Agreement, supra note 142, art. XXIII.  The 1947 Philippines 
Basing Agreement expired in 1991, and the Philippine Senate rejected a treaty that would have 
extended its terms.  DAVID S. SORENSON, MILITARY BASE CLOSURE: A REFERENCE 
HANDBOOK 116 (2007). 
 147. Philippines Basing Agreement, supra note 142, art. XXIII; GAO BASE CLOSURES 
REPORT, supra note 7, at 29. 
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resulting from environmental damage that did not manifest 
themselves for longer periods of time.148 
Furthermore, many agreements either relieve the United States 
of any obligation to remediate environmental damage or include a 
waiver for claims arising from damage to the host nation’s property.149  
The SOFA between the United States and Japan, for instance, 
provides that “[t]he United States is not obliged, when it returns 
facilities and areas to Japan . . . to restore the facilities and areas to 
the condition in which they were at the time they became available to 
the United States armed forces, or to compensate Japan in lieu of 
such restoration.”150  The 1947 basing agreement between the United 
States and the Philippines also provided that “[t]he United States is 
not obligated to turn over the bases to the Philippines . . . in the 
condition in which they were at the time of their occupation . . . .”151  
Finally, the SOFA between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), of which the United States is a member, 
provides that each party “waives all its claims against any other 
Contracting Party for damage to any property owned by it and used 
by its land; sea or air armed services . . . .”152  As a result, many host 
nations have either disclaimed their right to enforce environmental 
remediation standards, or have agreed to waive any claims for 
damages resulting from environmental harm caused by the DoD.153 
The United States thus has a long history of entering into SOFAs 
or basing agreements that fail to provide meaningful environmental 
protections for host nations.  Given that the United States often 
enters into agreements with host nations which are much less 
powerful, and which may not value environmental protection, or 
which may concede environmental compliance and remediation 
standards in favor of the economic benefits provided by U.S. military 
 
 148. Philippines Basing Agreement, supra note 142, art. XXIII; GAO BASE CLOSURES 
REPORT, supra note 7, at 29.  
 149. Phelps, supra note 15, at 82. 
 150. Agreement Under Article IV of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security 
Between the United States of America and Japan, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the 
Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan, U.S.-Japan, art. IV, Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 
1652. 
 151. Philippines Basing Agreement, supra note 142, art. XVII, para. 2; see also GAO BASE 
CLOSURES REPORT, supra note 7, at 29 (analyzing the Philippines Basing Agreement). 
 152. Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of 
Their Forces art. VIII, para. 1, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, 199 U.N.T.S. 67; see also Phelps, 
supra note 15, at 82 (describing the NATO SOFA). 
 153. See Phelps, supra note 15, at 57–58. 
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bases, the majority of international agreements are not likely to 
include clauses providing definite standards for environmental 
compliance and remediation.  Without such standards, commanders 
have few incentives to provide adequate environmental protection 
and remediation. 
It is, therefore, unlikely that changes to the DoD’s overseas 
environmental policy will be effected through international 
agreements. 
2.  Customary International Law 
It is often argued that the United States, in failing to prevent and 
remedy environmental harms at overseas military bases and during 
operations, is violating a duty under customary international law not 
to harm the environment of other nations.154  This principle has been 
most famously articulated in the Trail Smelter Case regarding 
transboundary air pollution between the United States and Canada.155  
There, the Special Arbitral Tribunal found that “no State has the 
right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to 
cause injury . . . in or to the territory of another or the properties or 
persons therein . . . .”156 
The International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) has also issued several 
opinions indicating its approval of this obligation.  In the 1949 Corfu 
Channel Case, for instance, the I.C.J. found that it was “every State’s 
obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts 
contrary to the rights of other States.”157  More recently, in its 1996 
advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, the I.C.J. noted that “[t]he existence of the general 
obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction 
and control respect the environment of other States or of areas 
beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law 
relating to the environment.”158 
 
 154. See, e.g., Kim David Chanbonpin, Comment, Holding the United States Accountable for 
Environmental Damages Caused by the U.S. Military in the Philippines, a Plan for the Future, 4 
ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 245, 280–83 (2003); J. Martin Wagner & Neil A.F. Popovic, 
Environmental Injustice on United States Bases in Panama: International Law and the Right to 
Land Free from Contamination and Explosives, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 401, 439–42 (1998). 
 155. Wagner & Popovic, supra note 154, at 440. 
 156. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 1905, 1965 (1941). 
 157. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9). 
 158. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 
241–42, para. 29 (July 8). 
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The United Nations has convened several conferences resulting 
in multilateral affirmation of this obligation.  Principle 21 of the 1972 
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment (Stockholm Declaration) declared that “[s]tates 
have . . . the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of 
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”159  
Subsequently, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development (Rio Declaration) reaffirmed the Stockholm 
Declaration and restated Principle 21 in the context of sustainable 
development.160 
The overseas environmental policy of the DoD violates the 
principle that a nation’s activities should not cause environmental 
harm to other states.  Yet, though this principle should be morally 
binding, it is not legally binding under norms of customary 
international law.  Customary international law “is composed only of 
those rules that States universally abide by, or accede to, out of a 
sense of legal obligation and mutual concern.”161  The United States 
recognizes that customary international law creates legal obligations 
among States; however, federal courts are only required to “take 
judicial notice of, and to give effect to” rules of customary 
international law in the absence of an applicable treaty or domestic 
statute, judicial decision, or executive act.162 
As such, the decisions of the Special Arbitral Tribunal and the 
I.C.J. do not create legal obligations binding on the DoD’s 
environmental policies.  The Special Arbitral Tribunal’s decision in 
the Trail Smelter Case, for instance, is only binding on the United 
States and Canada with respect to that particular case, and does not 
create obligations with respect to third parties.  The United States 
and Canada convened the Special Arbitral Tribunal by Special 
Agreement, signifying their consent to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and 
 
 159. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5–16, 
1972, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, part II, para. 
21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (June 16, 1972), available at http:// 
www.unep.org/Law/PDF/Stockholm_Declaration.pdf [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].  
 160. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., 
June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, para. 2, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992), available at 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm [hereinafter Rio 
Declaration]. 
 161. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 248 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 162. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 707 (1900). 
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to be bound by its decision.163  Because other states did not submit 
themselves to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the United States 
cannot be obligated to comply with the Tribunal’s decision in its 
relations with them.  Furthermore, the United States and Canada 
consented to be bound to the Tribunal’s decision, but only with 
respect to that case.  For this reason, in a subsequent treaty with 
Canada regarding transboundary air pollution, the United States 
noted only a “tradition of environmental cooperation as reflected 
in . . . the Trail Smelter Arbitration of 1941,” but did not refer to the 
decision as binding law.164  The Trail Smelter Case, therefore, does not 
impose obligations on the United States with respect to the effects of 
its environmental policies on third parties. 
Similarly, the I.C.J. is not “empowered to create binding norms 
of customary international law.”165  Under Article 59 of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice, decisions such as Corfu Channel 
“[have] no binding force except between the parties and in respect of 
that particular case.”166  Additionally, advisory opinions, as on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, are, by definition, 
advisory, and do not constitute binding international law.167 
Furthermore, U.S. courts have determined that the United 
Nations’ Stockholm and Rio Declarations did not create a norm of 
customary international law binding on the United States.  The 
Second Circuit, in Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., explicitly 
recognized that the Rio, and, by implication, the Stockholm, 
Declarations did not evidence customary international law with which 
the United States was obligated to comply.168  “Such declarations,” 
according to the court, “are almost invariably political statements—
expressing the . . . aspirations and demands of some countries or 
organizations—rather than statements of universally-recognized legal 
obligations.”169  Specifically, the Rio Declaration expressed 
“boundless and indeterminate” principles that were “devoid of 
 
 163. See generally Special Agreement: Convention for Settlement of Difficulties Arising 
from Operation of Smelter at Trail, B.C., U.S.-Can., Apr. 15, 1935, U.S.T.S. No. 893. 
 164. See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of Canada on Air Quality, U.S.-Can., para. 8, Mar. 13, 1991, T.I.A.S. No. 11,783 
[hereinafter U.S.-Canada Treaty]. 
 165. Flores, 414 F.3d at 263. 
 166. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055.  
 167. See id. art. 65. 
 168. See Flores, 414 F.3d at 262. 
 169. Id. 
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articulable or discernable standards and regulations,”170 and did not 
include any language “indicating that the [nations] joining in the 
Declaration intended to be legally bound by it.”171  Since the Rio, and, 
by implication, the Stockholm, Declarations did not create any 
enforceable legal obligations, they “do not provide reliable evidence 
of customary international law.”172 
Thus, although the DoD’s overseas environmental policy should 
not, in the spirit of international cooperation and environmental 
protection, violate this principle, the DoD is not bound by customary 
international law to ensure that its policies do not cause 
environmental harm to other States. 
B.  Federal Statutes with Extraterritorial Effect 
The DoD requires that EEAs and commanders consider 
applicable federal statutes with extraterritorial effect in developing 
FGS under Instruction 4715.5 and the OEBGD.173  Two of the most 
important federal environmental statutes are NEPA174 and 
CERCLA.175  NEPA, for instance, effects pollution prevention by 
aiming to influence decision-makers in the DoD to consider solutions 
that would prevent, or minimize, environmental harm.176  
Additionally, CERCLA imposes liability for environmental 
contamination caused by the DoD.177  The DoD would thus likely 
consider NEPA and CERCLA as federal statutes that are 
“applicable” to its environmental policy at military bases overseas. 
NEPA and CERCLA, however, do not meet the DoD’s 
requirement that statutes must have extraterritorial effect.  In order 
for a federal statute to control activities overseas, it must overcome a 
strong “presumption against extraterritoriality.”178  Since NEPA and 
CERCLA do not meet the requirements to overcome this 
 
 170. Id. at 255 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 171. Id. at 263. 
 172. See id. 
 173. See supra note 132. 
 174. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2006). 
 175. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006). 
 176. See Wagner & Popovic, supra note 154, at 427. 
 177. See id. at 428. 
 178. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 
244, 248 (1991). 
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presumption, their mandates cannot dictate DoD environmental 
policies overseas. 
1. The Applicability of NEPA and CERCLA to the Department 
 of Defense’s Overseas Environmental Policy 
 a. NEPA 
NEPA is considered to be the cornerstone of environmental 
protection under federal law.179  Congress enacted NEPA in 1969 to 
“declare a national policy which will encourage productive and 
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote 
efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment . . . 
and stimulate the health and welfare of man; [and] to enrich the 
understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources 
important to the Nation . . . .”180 
NEPA does not dictate policy or establish substantive standards 
for environmental regulation, but rather mandates procedures to 
ensure that federal agencies incorporate into their decision-making 
processes the environmental effects of proposed actions.181  Section 
102(2)(C) of NEPA thus requires all federal agencies, including the 
DoD, that are planning “major Federal actions significantly affecting 
the quality of the human environment” to assess the environmental 
impact of the proposed actions.182  If the assessment indicates that the 
proposed action will significantly impact the environment, agencies 
must then prepare a “detailed statement,”183 known as an 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), reporting the results of their 
findings.184  The purpose of the EIS is to inform decision-makers so 
that they may “avoid or minimize” the adverse environmental 
impacts of their decisions wherever possible.185 
 b. CERCLA 
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 “in response to the serious 
environmental and health risks posed by industrial pollution.”186  
 
 179. Wagner & Popovic, supra note 154, at 427. 
 180. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006). 
 181. Envtl. Def. Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 182. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Wagner & Popovic, supra note 154, at 427. 
 185. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(e) (2008). 
 186. Arc Ecology v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 411 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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CERCLA’s primary objectives were “to ensure the prompt and 
effective cleanup of waste disposal sites, and to assure that parties 
responsible for hazardous substances [bear] the cost of remedying the 
conditions they created.”187 
CERCLA is not a regulatory statute, but rather imposes liability 
on responsible parties for environmental contamination.  CERCLA 
specifies that any covered party, including federal agencies such as 
the DoD,188 is liable for: (1) the costs of investigation and assessment 
of any “release” or “substantial threat” of release189 of hazardous 
substances or contaminants which may present “an imminent and 
substantial danger to the public health or welfare;”190 (2) the costs of 
removal or remediation of the contamination; and (3) damages for 
harm to natural resources.191 
Once it is determined that there has been a release, or that there 
is a threat of release, CERCLA mandates removal, remedial action, 
or abatement when the release poses an “imminent and substantial 
endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment.”192  
CERCLA specifies that “remedial actions in which treatment 
permanently and significantly” reduces contaminants should “be 
preferred over remedial actions not involving such treatment.”193  
Remedial actions are complete when they “attain a degree of cleanup 
and . . . control of further release” that, at the very least, “assures 
protection of human health and the environment.”194 
2.  The Extraterritorial Application of NEPA and CERCLA 
Federal courts have made it fairly clear, however, that NEPA 
and CERCLA may not be applied extraterritorially to govern 
environmental policy at overseas military bases.195  Courts have 
 
 187. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 188. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (2006) (stating that the term “person” includes the U.S. 
Government). 
 189. “Release means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, 
discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment . . . .”  Id. 
§ 9601(22). 
 190. Id. § 9604(a)(1). 
 191. Id. § 9607(a). 
 192. Id. § 9604(a)(1); 9606(a). 
 193. Id. § 9621(b)(1). 
 194. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(1). 
 195. “Extraterritoriality” is defined as a “jurisdictional concept concerning the authority of a 
nation to . . . establish the norms of conduct applicable to events or persons outside its borders.”   
Massey, 986 F.2d at 530. 
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enunciated a “longstanding principle . . . that legislation of Congress, 
unless a contrary intent appears, is [presumed] to apply only within 
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”196  The primary 
purpose of this presumption against extraterritoriality is to protect 
against conflicts between federal laws and those of other States which 
could adversely affect international relations.197 
There are, however, three categories of cases in which the 
presumption against extraterritoriality will not apply: (1) where 
Congress has clearly expressed an “affirmative intention” to apply the 
statute extraterritorially,198 as determined, in part, by consideration of 
the foreign policy implications of extraterritorial application;199 (2) 
where failure to apply the statute to a foreign setting would “result in 
adverse effects within the United States;” or (3) where “the conduct 
regulated by the government occurs within the United States.”200 
Because neither NEPA nor CERCLA satisfies the exceptions to 
the presumption against extraterritorially, change in DoD overseas 
environmental policy cannot be effected through the extraterritorial 
application of these statutes. 
a. Congressional Intent 
NEPA and CERCLA may be applied extraterritorially to 
overseas military bases if Congress has expressed an “affirmative 
intention” to do so.201  Congress has the authority to enforce its laws 
overseas.202  However, courts assume that Congress legislates under a 
presumption against extraterritoriality.203  Therefore, unless Congress 
clearly expresses its intent to give a statute extraterritorial effect, 
courts assume that Congress intended the legislation to apply 
domestically.204 
 
 196. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 
244, 248 (1991) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Massey, 986 F.2d at 531 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 199. See Arc Ecology, 411 F.3d at 1094; Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 759 (D. 
Haw. 1990). 
 200. Massey, 986 F.2d at 531 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 201. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 202. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
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 i. NEPA 
Although NEPA’s language indicates that Congress was 
concerned with both domestic and global environmental problems, it 
does not state clearly whether Congress intended NEPA to apply 
extraterritorially.  Congress indicated its concern for global 
environmental issues, for instance, in section 102(2)(F) of NEPA, 
which directed federal agencies to “recognize the worldwide and 
long-range character of environmental problems.”205  Additionally, 
section 2 states Congress’ intention that NEPA will “encourage 
productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his 
environment,”206 not just between man and the national environment.  
Congress, however, limited the extraterritorial implications of its 
previous statements by making clear that any actions taken in 
furtherance of international environmental cooperation must be 
“consistent with the foreign policy of the United States.”207  
Furthermore, NEPA’s legislative history provides no indication 
whether Congress contemplated extraterritorial application.208  
Congress’ intention regarding the extraterritorial application of 
NEPA is thus “obscure.”209 
As a result of Congress’ conflicting statements, courts have 
declined to decide whether NEPA may be given extraterritorial 
effect, instead limiting their decisions to the facts of the cases before 
them.  Courts, therefore, “must determine whether Congress 
intended NEPA to apply under circumstances such as these and 
whether, under the unique facts presented, defendants have violated 
NEPA by failing to prepare a comprehensive EIS for actions 
taken . . . within a foreign country . . . .”210  The determination of 
whether Congress intended NEPA to apply extraterritorially must 
also take into consideration the foreign policy implications of 
extraterritorial application under those circumstances.211  If applying 
NEPA extraterritorially would threaten U.S. foreign policy, courts 
 
 205. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F) (2006); Browne C. 
Lewis, It’s a Small World After All: Making the Case for the Extraterritorial Application of the 
National Environmental Policy Act, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 2143, 2169 (2004). 
 206. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (emphasis added); Lewis, supra note 205, at 2169. 
 207. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F). 
 208. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n (NRDC v. NRC), 647 F.2d 
1345, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Robinson, J., concurring in the judgment).  
 209. Id. 
 210. Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 759 (D. Haw. 1990). 
 211. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F) (stating that agency actions overseas must be 
“consistent with the foreign policy of the United States”). 
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presume that Congress did not intend NEPA to apply 
extraterritorially in that case.212 
Given that NEPA’s statutory language and legislative history do 
not clearly state congressional intent, courts have largely considered 
the U.S. foreign policy implications of applying NEPA 
extraterritorially to be determinative.213  In Natural Resources Defense 
Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRDC v. NRC), for 
example, the D.C. Circuit considered whether the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission was required to prepare an EIS prior to 
exporting a nuclear reactor to the Philippines.214  In determining 
whether Congress intended NEPA to be applied extraterritorially to 
environmental impacts in the Philippines, the court concluded that, 
within the context of nuclear technology exports, imposition of U.S. 
standards on foreign nations would adversely affect U.S. 
nonproliferation objectives, as nations may be deterred from 
purchasing reliable nuclear technologies from the United States.215  
Therefore, Congress did not intend for NEPA to impose an EIS 
requirement on nuclear export decisions with respect to 
environmental impacts occurring solely within foreign jurisdictions.216 
The D.C. Circuit adopted a different approach in Environmental 
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey.217  The Environmental Defense Fund 
alleged “that the National Science Foundation (NSF) [had] violated 
NEPA by failing to prepare an [EIS] in accordance with section 
102(2)(C) before going forward with plans to incinerate food wastes 
in Antarctica.”218  In determining whether Congress intended NEPA 
to apply extraterritorially to actions in Antarctica, the court held that 
the presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply where “the 
alleged extraterritorial effect of the statute will be felt in Antarctica—
 
 212. See Greenpeace USA, 748 F. Supp. at 759 (“[T]he court must take into consideration 
the foreign policy implications of applying NEPA within a foreign nation’s borders.”). 
 213. See id. 
 214. NRDC v. NRC, 647 F.2d at 1346–48. 
 215. See id. at 1347–48. 
 216. Id.; see also Greenpeace USA, 748 F. Supp. at 760–61 (holding that, because requiring 
the U.S. Army to prepare an EIS before removing an arms stockpile from West Germany would 
result in timing delays that would violate substantive provisions of an agreement negotiated 
between the President and West Germany, and because environmental assessment would 
violate West Germany’s sovereignty, Congress did not intend NEPA to apply to the movement 
of munitions through West Germany). 
 217. Massey, 986 F.2d at 528.  
 218. Id. at 529. 
Laporte_Fmt5 .doc 2/12/2010  9:57:52 AM 
Winter 2010 BEING ALL IT CAN BE 233 
a continent without a sovereign,” and where the United States 
exercised legislative control.219 
In doing so, the court recognized the foreign policy 
considerations illustrated in NRDC v. NRC, stating that “the 
government may avoid the EIS requirement where U.S. foreign 
policy interests outweigh the benefits derived from preparing an 
EIS.”220  Because there was no conflict of laws between the United 
States and Antarctica, the presumption against extraterritoriality did 
not apply.221  The court, however, specifically limited its holding to 
Antarctica, where the potential for foreign policy conflicts is low, and 
did not decide “how NEPA might apply to actions in a case involving 
an actual foreign sovereign . . . .”222 
The District Court for the District of Columbia subsequently 
held that NEPA does not require the DoD to prepare an EIS for U.S. 
military installations in Japan.223  Plaintiffs in NEPA Coalition of 
Japan v. Aspin argued that, following Massey, the court should apply 
NEPA extraterritorially.224  The court again limited its holding to the 
facts of the case,225 but held that the legal status of U.S. bases in Japan, 
a sovereign nation, “is not analogous to the status of American 
research stations in Antarctica,” over which no state is sovereign.226  
The court also determined that requiring the DoD to prepare EISs 
would risk interfering with the treaty relationship between the United 
States and Japan. The court explained that the United States would 
intrude on Japan’s sovereignty in preparing EISs by collecting 
environmental data from areas outside the base.227  Congress, 
therefore, did not intend NEPA to apply “where there is a substantial 
likelihood that treaty relations will be affected.”228 
Following Aspin, it is unlikely that a court would support the 
extraterritorial application of NEPA to overseas military bases in any 
sovereign nation.  The concerns that the District Court for the 
District of Columbia raised in Aspin, that the preparation of EISs in 
 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 535. 
 221. Id. at 533. 
 222. Id. at 537. 
 223. NEPA Coal. of Japan v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466, 467 (D.D.C. 1993). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 468. 
 226. Id. at 467. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
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accordance with NEPA regulations would intrude on foreign nations’ 
sovereignty and may conflict with the terms of international 
agreements,229 are applicable to U.S. military bases and operations in 
any foreign nation.  A court would likely determine that, given the 
foreign policy implications, Congress did not intend NEPA to apply 
extraterritorially to U.S. military activities overseas. 
 ii. CERCLA 
Unlike NEPA, courts have found that Congress clearly did not 
intend CERCLA to apply extraterritorially.  In Arc Ecology v. U.S. 
Department of the Air Force, for example, appellants sought to 
compel the DoD to perform a preliminary assessment and cleanup of 
former U.S. bases in the Philippines.230  In concluding that Congress 
did not intend CERCLA to have extraterritorial effect, the Ninth 
Circuit looked at the plain language of the statute.  The court 
determined that CERCLA’s “general approach, concerns, and 
procedures are inimical to judicial challenges to contamination 
alleged from sites outside the . . . United States.”231  In support of its 
decision, the court showed that, although CERCLA provisions 
specify that certain procedures are to be undertaken domestically, it 
does not contemplate any similar procedures to be undertaken in 
foreign countries.232 
The court also based its conclusion on the foreign policy 
implications of applying CERCLA extraterritorially.  The court 
recognized the DoD’s concern, expressed in Directive 6050.7,233 that 
both treaty obligations and the sovereignty of foreign nations must be 
respected, and that agencies should exercise restraint in applying U.S. 
laws extraterritorially unless Congress has clearly expressed the 
contrary intent.234  The court thus determined that it would be 
“unreasonable” to find that Congress intended CERCLA to have 
extraterritorial effect, as environmental assessments or cleanups on 
foreign soil without an agreement would violate the nation’s 
 
 229. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. at 467. 
 230. Arc Ecology, 411 F.3d at 1094. 
 231. Id. at 1100. 
 232. See id.; see also, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(2) (2006) (requiring that the President “consult with 
the affected State or States” before determining appropriate remedial action, but providing no 
provision for consultation with foreign authorities). 
 233. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 234. Arc Ecology, 411 F.3d at 1103. 
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sovereignty, and would “impermissibly encroach” on the U.S. 
President’s foreign affairs authority.235 
As a result of Arc Ecology’s holding, that Congress did not 
intend CERCLA to apply extraterritorially to regulate overseas bases 
in the Philippines, it is unlikely that any court would require the 
DoD’s environmental policies in any nation to comply with 
CERCLA. 
b. Effects Test 
Under the effects test, NEPA and CERCLA may be applied 
extraterritorially where failure to do so would result in adverse effects 
within the United States.236  The effects test allows legislation to 
regulate foreign conduct that is likely to cause “foreseeable and 
substantial” harmful effects within the United States.237  The test is 
illustrated by Hirt v. Richardson, in which plaintiffs requested a 
preliminary injunction, alleging that the Department of Energy had 
violated NEPA by failing to prepare an EIS related to a U.S.-funded 
shipment of nuclear wastes.238  The wastes were to have been shipped 
from Russia to Canada, but would pass close to the U.S. border on 
their way through Canada.239  The District Court stated that “the facts 
in this case warrant extraterritorial application of NEPA.”240  It 
concluded that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their argument that 
the Department of Energy had been arbitrary and capricious in 
failing to prepare an EIS because the U.S. federal government 
exercised control over the Russian shipment and an accident, 
however remote the possibility, would substantially affect the United 
States.241 
Here, NEPA and CERCLA may not be applied extraterritorially 
to overseas military bases and operations under the effects test.  
Failure to apply these statutes to overseas military activities likely will 
not result in “foreseeable and substantial” effects within the United 
States. 
 
 235. Id. at 1099. 
 236. Massey, 986 F.2d at 531. 
 237. Tamari v. Bache & Co., 730 F.2d 1103, 1106 n.6 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 238. Hirt v. Richardson, 127 F. Supp. 2d 833, 837 (W.D. Mich. 1999). 
 239. Id. at 836–37. 
 240. Id. at 844. 
 241. Id. at 844–45. 
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c. Conduct Test 
Under the conduct test, legislation is deemed to apply 
domestically where the conduct regulated by the legislation occurs in 
the United States.242  NEPA and CERCLA may, therefore, impose 
liability on foreign corporations, or on U.S. actors for harmful 
activities committed overseas, where the conduct regulated by the 
statutes occurs within the United States.243  For example, in Massey, 
the D.C. Circuit determined that, because NEPA is a procedural 
rather than a substantive statute, the conduct it regulates is the 
decision-making of federal agencies.244  Since the NSF’s decision-
making processes occurred within the United States, requiring the 
NSF to prepare an EIS before incinerating food wastes in Antarctica 
was a domestic, rather than an extraterritorial, application of 
NEPA.245 
In Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that CERCLA regulates the “actual or threatened release” 
of hazardous substances.246  Plaintiffs filed suit under CERCLA’s 
“citizen suit” provision to compel the Environmental Protection 
Agency to enforce an order it had issued against Teck Cominco 
Metals, Ltd., a Canadian corporation, requiring it to conduct a 
remedial investigation/feasibility study in a portion of the Columbia 
River located entirely within the United States, where hazardous 
substances that Teck Cominco had discharged in Canada had 
accumulated.247  The court held that, because the “release” occurred 
within the United States, CERCLA was applied domestically, rather 
than extraterritorially, to impose liability on Teck Cominco.248 
Here, the application of NEPA to overseas military activities 
would likely be considered domestic, as the majority of the DoD’s 
decision-making likely occurs within the United States.249  The 
application of CERCLA would almost certainly be considered 
 
 242. Massey, 986 F.2d at 531. 
 243. See id. 
 244. Id. at 532. 
 245. See id.  
 246. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. 
denied, 128 S. Ct. 858 (2008). 
 247. Id. at 1068. 
 248. Id. at 1079. 
 249. See Massey, 986 F.2d at 532 (“[T]he decisionmaking processes of federal agencies take 
place almost exclusively in [the United States] . . . .”). 
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extraterritorial, as any “releases” are unlikely to occur within the 
United States.250 
Yet, even if NEPA and CERCLA were determined to apply to 
government action overseas under either the conduct or effects tests, 
courts must still balance the benefits of preparing an EIS against 
foreign policy considerations.251  Thus, for example, the Hirt Court 
declined to issue an injunction preventing the transportation of 
nuclear wastes from Russia to Canada, despite the fact that plaintiffs 
were injured by the Department of Energy’s failure to prepare an 
EIS.252  The Court cited the “weighty considerations” of U.S. foreign 
policy, nuclear non-proliferation, and the interests of the President in 
carrying out U.S. foreign policy.253  Furthermore, in Aspin, the D.C. 
Circuit limited Massey’s holding, which could be read to indicate that 
NEPA may always be applied extraterritorially, to the unique facts of 
the case.254  The court then stated that, even if NEPA could be applied 
extraterritorially, the DoD would not be required to prepare EISs, as 
U.S. foreign policy interests outweighed the benefits of 
environmental assessment.255 
Therefore, in the case of environmental regulation of overseas 
military bases and operations, courts would likely determine that (1) 
Congress did not intend NEPA and CERCLA to apply under 
circumstances implicating such weighty foreign policy considerations; 
and (2) even if NEPA and CERCLA could be applied 
extraterritorially, foreign policy considerations would outweigh any 
benefits gained from the DoD’s preparation of EISs. 
Any improvements in DoD environmental policy for overseas 
military bases, therefore, likely would not be effected through 
extraterritorial application of NEPA and CERCLA. 
C.  Executive Orders 
Executive orders can improve DoD overseas environmental 
policy in ways in which international agreements and applicable 
federal statutes cannot.  First, the President has unquestionable 
constitutional authority to issue executive orders under Article II, 
 
 250. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (2006) (defining “release”); Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1079. 
 251. See Massey, 986 F.2d at 533; Aspin, 837 F. Supp. at 468. 
 252. Hirt, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 849. 
 253. Id. 
 254. See Aspin, 837 F. Supp. at 466. 
 255. Id. at 468. 
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Section 3, instructing that the President “shall take care that the laws 
be faithfully executed.”256  The President, as “commander in chief of 
the Army and the Navy,” has even greater authority to issue 
executive orders pertaining to the DoD.257  Furthermore, directing 
overseas environmental policy through executive orders can effect 
improvements on a broad array of military actions overseas.  For 
instance, although DoD oversees environmental compliance policies, 
as stated in the OEBGD and FGS, do not apply to operational 
deployments,258 the environmental annexes in operations plans that 
accompany such operations are subject to executive orders.259 
Through executive orders, the President may also effect the 
extraterritorial application of environmental principles expressed in 
domestic statutes.  President Carter’s Executive Order 12114 
regarding the environmental effects of federal actions abroad, for 
instance, stated that, although based on independent authority, the 
Order’s purpose was to further the goals of NEPA, as well as a 
number of other environmental regulatory statutes.260  Thus, like 
section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, the Order required the preparation and 
consideration of an EIS before undertaking a “major Federal action 
significantly affecting the environment.”261  In essence, the Order gave 
extraterritorial effect to NEPA without implicating concerns that 
extraterritorial application of federal statutes would impermissibly 
infringe on the President’s foreign affairs authority.262  Although, 
given the Order’s broad exceptions, compliance with E.O. 12114 is 
not necessarily analogous to compliance with NEPA,263 the Order was 
able to export the statute’s spirit and many of its core requirements.264 
Finally, executive orders have proven the most effective at 
eliciting improvements in DoD overseas environmental policy.  The 
DoD has, for instance, issued new policy statements in response to 
 
 256. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 257. See id. § 2, cl. 1. 
 258. INSTRUCTION 4715.5, supra note 51, § 2.1.4; OEBGD, supra note 52, § C1.3.3. 
 259. Phelps, supra note 15, at 69–70. 
 260. E.O. 12114, supra note 26, § 1-1. 
 261. Id. § 2-3; National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006). 
 262. See, e.g., Arc Ecology, 411 F.3d at 1099 ; Hirt, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 849; Greenpeace USA, 
748 F. Supp. at 760–61.  
 263. See Greenpeace USA, 748 F. Supp. at 762 (“The court cannot conclude . . . that 
Executive Order 12114 preempts application of NEPA to all federal agency actions taken 
outside the United States.”). 
 264. See Fair, supra note 45, at 117. 
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E.O. 12114.265  Although the DoD’s response was inadequate to effect 
environmental protection at overseas military bases and during 
operations, any inadequacies were the result of exemptions or 
ambiguities in the Order itself, not in the DoD’s response to the 
Order.266  An executive order that did not contain such weaknesses 
would, therefore, have to be implemented by the DoD, and would 
likely result in more protective environmental policies. 
IV. EXECUTIVE ORDER: A PROPOSAL 
An executive order reaffirming the United States’ commitment 
to environmental protection abroad and issuing standards for the 
DoD at overseas military bases and during operations is the best 
means of effecting improvements in DoD overseas environmental 
policy.  A successful executive order must balance competing 
considerations, including the need to: (1) set adequate environmental 
standards without loopholes; (2) provide commanders discretion and 
flexibility in uncertain overseas environments; (3) respect foreign 
countries’ right to sovereignty; and (4) respect any international 
treaties signed with the host countries.  An executive order that 
rigidly imposes the highest environmental standards on the DoD 
might satisfy an ideal vision of how the DoD should conduct its 
environmental policies overseas, but would likely be resented and 
largely ignored by military base commanders implementing the 
policy.  The proposal for a new Executive Order below, therefore, 
attempts to balance these competing considerations while furthering 
the goal of environmental protection abroad. 
The Executive Order also attempts to provide guiding principles 
for commanders so that they may fill gaps in the DoD’s current policy 
regarding assessment, compliance, prevention, and remediation.  The 
Executive Order would replace E.O. 12114 to definitively set higher 
standards with fewer exemptions.267  Additionally, the Executive 
Order would address environmental regulation both at military bases 
and during military operations.  The express exemptions for military 
operations in many of the DoD’s policies, as in Instruction 4715.5 and 
the OEBGD,268 and the implied exemptions for operations that could 
be read into other policies, such as through the “participating nation 
 
 265. See supra Part II.A, .B. 
 266. See supra Part II.A. 
 267. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 268. See supra Part II.B. 
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exemption,”269 leave critical gaps in the regulation of much of the U.S. 
forces’ overseas military activities.  The Executive Order thus 
promotes a comprehensive regime of environmental principles and 
standards applicable to U.S. military actions worldwide. 
In order to further this goal, the Executive Order must first state 
the principles under which it is being issued.  The broadest principle, 
and that which is accepted to the greatest extent by the international 
community, is principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, as 
reaffirmed in the Rio Declaration.270  The Executive Order should 
thus state, in general terms, its reaffirmation and approval of the 
principle that “[s]tates have . . . the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to 
the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction.”271  Following this broad reaffirmation, the 
Executive Order should indicate that it is based on the President’s 
constitutional authority (rather than any statutory authority granted 
by Congress).  The Executive Order should also state that it is being 
issued with the purpose of furthering the goals of procedural statutes 
such as NEPA and CERCLA, and, to the extent possible given 
varying environmental conditions overseas and concern for the 
sovereignty of host nations, substantive statutes such as the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA),272 the Clean Air 
Act,273 and the Clean Water Act.274  In this way, the Executive Order 
would effect both pollution prevention and remediation.  Any agency 
interpreting the Executive Order would also be fully aware of the 
principles which must be furthered by its interpretation. 
The Executive Order’s standards must also be, to the greatest 
extent possible, equivalent to those in NEPA, CERCLA, and other 
domestic environmental statutes, rather than reflecting a minimum 
standard reserved for overseas bases and operations.  If Congress has 
determined that standards such as those embodied in NEPA and 
 
 269. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 270. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 159, part II, art. 21; Rio Declaration, supra note 
160, para. 2. 
 271. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 159, part II, art. 21.  The United States reaffirmed 
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration in a 1991 treaty with Canada regarding 
transboundary air pollution.  It is not, therefore, impossible that it might do so again.  See U.S.-
Canada Treaty, supra note 164. 
 272. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6922k 
(2006). 
 273. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006). 
 274. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006). 
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CERCLA are necessary to ensure the safety and health of the 
American people and their environment, there is no reason that 
lesser standards should be acceptable for those of other nations.  To 
implement such a policy is to admit that their health and their 
environment are less valuable than Americans’.  Additionally, setting 
overseas environmental standards in accordance with those of host 
nations will, in many instances, fail to provide adequate 
environmental regulations, as many host nations do not implement, 
or enforce, effective environmental policies.275  Furthermore, as the 
GAO states, it is “essential” that U.S. regulations be used in nations 
where operations take place in order to protect U.S. personnel—
“[n]ot protecting U.S. personnel and the environment just because a 
host country does not enforce its environmental laws does not appear 
to be prudent.”276 
Thus, just as E.O. 12114 imported the EIS requirement and 
language of NEPA, this Executive Order should import both the EIS 
requirement of NEPA and the assessment and remediation 
requirements of CERCLA in order to effect change in the DoD’s 
overseas environmental policy.277  In particular, NEPA and 
CERCLA’s requirements regarding the DoD’s obligations prior to, 
and following, the closure of military bases should be imported to 
remedy some of the most lacking provisions of DoD overseas 
environmental policy.278  Although environmental standards would, 
ideally, exceed those set in NEPA and CERCLA to achieve 
significant improvements, these are standards which Congress 
understands and for which it is capable of budgeting.  These are also 
standards that the DoD has experience implementing in the United 
States, and would thus be more successfully applied abroad than 
newly heightened standards. 
In importing the requirements of NEPA and CERCLA, the 
Executive Order must clearly define their key terms and avoid 
exemptions through which the DoD may circumvent compliance.  
Clearly defined standards would also effect uniformly adequate 
protection and avoid confusion within the DoD regarding 
implementation.  Thus, the Executive Order’s key terms should be 
 
 275. See supra Part II.B. 
 276. GAO HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORT, supra note 12, at 25–26. 
 277. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 278. See supra Part III.B.1.  It may not be possible, or advisable, to impose the requirements 
of substantive statutes, such as the RCRA, Clean Air Act, and Clean Water Act on sovereign 
foreign nations. 
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defined with reference to the relevant definitions of NEPA, 
CERCLA, and other relevant statutes.  Where ambiguities exist, the 
Executive Order should clearly define the term, taking into 
consideration its interpretation by federal agencies.  For instance, 
E.O. 12144 defined the term “significantly affects the environment” 
as an action that does “significant harm to the environment,” leaving 
the meaning of the term “significant” to the discretion of agency 
officials.  Although NEPA also left the term ambiguous, the 
Department of State explained that, in reviewing for potentially 
significant environmental effects abroad, an agency official should 
consider potential direct effects on the . . . environment . . . which 
may be caused by the action and occur at the same time and place.  
[The agency official] should also consider reasonably foreseeable 
significant indirect effects on the natural and physical environment 
potentially caused by the action but occurring later in time.279 
The Department of State also specified five categories which the 
official must consider in determining whether an action is 
“significant.”280  Rather than leaving such interpretations to agency 
discretion, the Order should specify such standards itself. 
The Order, however, must balance these standards with the need 
for commanders to have the discretion and flexibility to quickly and 
effectively respond to national security concerns, operations such as 
peacekeeping missions, and changing host nation conditions at 
overseas military bases.  The preparation of an EIS in such situations 
may not be possible, or, if possible, may result in detrimental delays.  
Rather than including broad exemptions for all actions requiring 
heightened discretion and flexibility, the Order should allow for an 
exemption only when the preparation of an EIS is not possible.  The 
Order should specify that, if the DoD could not conduct an EIS prior 
to taking action, it must undertake remedial efforts in those areas in 
which the United States maintains a presence.  This requirement may 
deter commanders from seeking an exemption when an EIS truly was 
feasible. 
If host country conditions will not allow for either an EIS or 
remedial action, as was the case in Somalia,281 then the DoD must use 
the latest technology available (not the latest technology currently 
available in that host country) in order to build pollution-prevention 
strategies into every aspect of its operational plans.  Such strategies 
 
 279. Environmental Review Procedures, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,004, 67,006 (Nov. 21, 1979). 
 280. Id. 
 281. See supra Part II.B. 
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must be both planned and implemented in order to significantly 
reduce contamination, or the risk of contamination. 
Furthermore, any exemptions that commanders request from the 
default standard of environmental assessment and remediation must 
be granted by the President, not by the DoD.  The President would 
have the power to delegate this authority to other executive branch 
administrators in the DoD or the Environmental Protection Agency.  
This provision would provide a measure of oversight for the 
implementation of the Executive Order.  Therefore, while uniform 
standards for environmental assessment and remediation must be 
clearly defined in order to ensure compliance with the goals of the 
Executive Order, commanders will be given some discretion and 
flexibility regarding the implementation of these standards. 
Many military officials have expressed concern that unilaterally 
applying U.S. environmental standards would violate host nations’ 
right to sovereignty, causing political or diplomatic problems.282  
However, enforcing U.S. regulations on portions of military bases 
where U.S. operations, such as maintenance of aircraft, are taking 
place would not likely cause political or diplomatic problems.283  Yet, 
because, as the GAO states, problems would result if the DoD 
enforced U.S. laws on host country operations on other parts of 
military bases,284 the Executive Order must include provisions 
protecting the sovereignty of host nations. 
The most effective provision would be one requiring the 
Department of State, when negotiating international agreements such 
as SOFAs and basing agreements, to negotiate for provisions 
including concrete substantive and procedural environmental 
standards based on U.S. regulations.  This would be in stark contrast 
to the current policy of negotiating to eliminate concrete 
environmental requirements.  The treaties should specify that if host 
country laws provide more protection than U.S. environmental 
standards, the more protective laws, as written, should govern.  
Including heightened regulatory standards in agreements between the 
U.S. and host countries would thus avoid concerns that 
 
 282. See, e.g., GAO HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORT, supra note 12, at 25; Hamilton, supra 
note 23, at 4; Phelps, supra note 15, at 79–80. 
 283. GAO HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORT, supra note 12, at 25. 
 284. Id. 
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environmental regulations would interfere with host nations’ 
sovereignty, U.S. foreign policy, and treaty agreements.285 
Furthermore, the DoD should negotiate environmental 
assessments and remediation with the host country.  Like the United 
States’ nuclear non-proliferation policy, one of the DoD’s goals in 
negotiating with the host country should be to encourage safe 
environmental practices.286  As the D.C. Circuit explained, 
“[n]onproliferation cannot be achieved by nonparticipation by the 
United States in the world commerce in nuclear machinery and 
materials; our policy set by the Congress recognizes that American 
abstention from international nuclear trade risks leaving the field to 
less responsible suppliers and encouraging uncontrolled 
proliferation.”287  This logic is applicable to environmental regulation 
as well—unless the United States actively participates in the 
environmental protection of host countries, particularly where it is 
responsible for the environmental damage, it will be encouraging 
uncontrolled environmental harm. 
 
 
 285. See supra note 41 and accompanying text; Arc Ecology, 411 F.3d at 1103; Aspin, 837 F. 
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 286. See NRDC v. NRC, 647 F.2d at 1347.  
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